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                1  
Empirical Analysis of Price Setting and Quantity Surcharges 
in the German Food Sector 
 
1. Introduction 
The on-going globalization has resulted in increasing competition in the European food 
sector, as both manufacturers and retailers vie for higher market shares.  It has long been 
argued  that  product  differentiation  constitutes  a  relevant  marketing  strategy  in  ensuring 
positive profits in a competitive environment. Commodity bundling which involves producers 
supplying the same physical commodity in different package sizes in order to cater for the 
diverse tastes and demand of different consumers groups has been widely accepted as a form 
of product differentiation. Producers therefore choose package sizes and prices to maximize 
profits, while consumers select package sizes that maximize their utilities (Gerstner and Hess, 
1987).  
Given the significance of transparent unit pricing for consumers, the European Parliament 
and the European Council established a directive 1998, on consumer protection that compels 
stores to display unit prices of products offered to consumers. The directive stipulates that the 
selling price and the unit price of all products must be indicated in an unambiguous, easily 
identifiable and clearly legible way for all products offered by traders to consumers.
1  
Concerning price setting behavior in the context of multiple package sizes, three different 
mechanisms can be observed.  First, unit prices decrease with rising package size, thus, a 
quantity discount is offered to the consumer. Furthermore, concerning linear pricing the unit 
price of a product proportionally increases to package size. Last, quantity surcharges occur 
when the unit price increases with rising package size. 
In view of the significance of unit price differences for different package sizes, several 
studies have been conducted to examine the incidence of quantity price surcharges in the food   2 
sector. However, most of the empirical work undertaken has been on the United States, and 
do show evidence of quantity price surcharges in the US food sector (Widrick (1979a,b); 
Nason, Della Bitta, 1983; Walker, Cude (1984); Gerstner and Hess, 1987; Agrarwal et al., 
1993; Gupta and Rominger, 1996; Manning et al., 1998; Sprott et al., 2003). The studies 
generally reveal quantity surcharges ranging from 7 to 34% of the investigated products. 
In contrast to the plethora of empirical studies on the United States, only few empirical 
studies have been carried out on the European food sector (McGoldrick, Marks (1985); Zotos, 
Lysonksi (1993); Benner, Heidecke (2005). In particular, none of the studies investigates the 
joint determination of the quantity price surcharges and quantity price discounts. Studies on 
the  degree  of  quantity  price  surcharges  are  also  conspicuously  absent  in  the  analysis  on 
European food markets.  
This paper therefore makes a contribution in this direction by developing a firm-level 
model of price setting behavior with regard to quantity price surcharges and quantity price 
discounts and presenting new empirical results, using a unique consumer scanner data of the 
German food sector. We specifically examine the incidence of quantity price surcharges and 
discounts, and also analyze the impact of product characteristics and firm attributes on the 
probability  of  occurrence  of  quantity  price  surcharges  and  quantity  price  discounts.  The 
determinants of the extent of quantity price surcharges and quantity price discounts are then 
analyzed,  controlling  for  sample  selectivity  bias.  The  expected  value  of  the  returns  from 
purchasing the largest package size for each product is also computed to determine if large 
package sizes result in losses or savings for consumers.  
The remainder of the analyses is organized as follows. The next section presents a review 
of recent empirical research on the incidence of quantity surcharges. Section 3 outlines the 
theoretical  model  employed  in  the  analysis,  while  the  next  section  presents  the  empirical 
specification, and the fifth section provides a description of the data and definition of the   3 
variables. The results from the analysis are then presented in section 6, while the final section 
presents concluding remarks. 
2. Review 
Earlier studies of firm-level price-setting behavior focused on documenting the incidence 
of  quantity  price  surcharges  and  providing  the  rationale  for  the  existence  of  quantity 
surcharges  in  the  food  sector  (see,  for  example,  Widrick,  1979; Cude and  Walker,  1984; 
Gerstner and Hess, 1987; Agrawal et al., 1993). For instance, Widrick (1979) and Cude and 
Walker (1984) empirically showed how extensive this price setting behavior is in several 
different  markets.  Gerstner  and  Hess  (1987)  focused  on  the  demand  side  of  unit  price 
variation and present a theoretical model to explain the determinants of unit price and package 
size  variation,  under  the  assumption  of  fully  informed  consumers.  They  argued  that 
consumers  with  low  storage  costs  prefer  large  packages  and  are  therefore  willing  to  pay 
higher unit prices. 
This is in contrasts to the model of Salop (1977) who did not assume that consumers are 
fully informed. He indicated that quantity price surcharges are a price discriminating device 
directed towards customers with high search costs. Empirical evidence on price search for 
groceries revealed that customers who search more generally pay lower prices than those who 
search less (e.g., Carlson and Gieseke, 1983). Given that theories presented by Salop (1979) 
and Gerstner and Hess (1987) are not able to explain the systematic variations in quantity 
price surcharges across product categories, Walden (1988) presented an explanation for the 
systematic  variations  in  quantity  surcharges  across  products  by  examining  supply 
characteristics.  Walden’s  model  basically  describes  the  decision  to  impose  quantity  price 
surcharge as a function of package costs, product turn-over rates and retailer storage costs. 
These  studies  were  followed  by  several  studies  that  incorporated  the  impact  of 
information search on the incidence of quantity price surcharges in their analyses (Agrawal et   4 
al., 1993; Gupta et al., 1996; Manning et al., 1998; Sprott et al. 2003; Schmidt, 2003). A 
common theme in these studies is that consumers can make product choices based on price 
search  during  a  particular  trip  and  that  unit  prices  posted  for  products  provide  useful 
information at the point of purchase. While the findings from the study by Sprott et al. (2003) 
support  their  contention  that  common  pricing  practices  aimed  at  establishing  a  favorable 
store-price image can result in quantity surcharges, the results obtained by Schmidt et al. 
(2003)  showed  no  evidence  of  quantity  price  surcharges.  The  present  paper  attempts  to 
explain the existence of both quantity price surcharges and price discounts across products by 
examining  supply  side  characteristics.  We  present  below  a  simple  model  to  explain  the 
incidence of both quantity price surcharges and price discounts across products. 
   
3. Theoretical Model 
Consider a supermarket that sets unit prices according to package sizes. Without loss of 
generality assume that the supermarket is a profit maximizing agent with some degree of 
market power. This is under the assumption that once consumers entered a specific store, time 
and travel costs of changing the store exceeds additional consumer utility from purchasing 
from a different store. Let y = f(x1i, x2i) denote the amount of output produced from x1i (small 
package sizes) and x2i (large package sizes). Let p(y) denote the inverse demand function and 
R(y) = p(y)y the revenue from sales of y units of output of product. If C(x1i, x2i) denotes the 
cost associated with the output y, the profit function for the agent can be specified as: 
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The  goal  of  profit  maximization  is  subject  to  display  space  restriction,  such  that  the 
positioning of small (t1i) and large (t2i) package sizes of different products are not allowed to 
exceed display space s:  
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Additionally, the retailer has to offer small as well as large package sizes: 
  0 , 2 1 > i i x x     (3) 
The decision problem includes the package size selection process of products as well as the 
determination of the unit prices for the different sized packages of the products. This can be 
restated formally as in equation (4): 
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where λ represents the Lagrangian multiplicator of the display space constraint.  
Since constraints (2) and (3) represent inequalities, maximization of the Lagrangian function 
with respect to x1i, x2i and λ requires consideration of first-order conditions, non-negativity 
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Equation (5) implies that in the optimal solution, the marginal revenue of package size x1i has 
to be equal to the marginal costs of x1i plus a component depending on the small package size 
(λt1i).  The  complementary  slackness  condition  in  equation  (5)  means  that,  if  the  optimal 
solution calls for active offer of package size x1i ( 0 1 ≥ i x ), the marginal revenue of x1i must be 
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), then the retailer has 
not to offer the package size of the product ( 0 1 = i x ).   6 
Accordingly, equation (6) express that in optimum, the marginal revenue of the large 
package  size  has  to  be  equal  to  the  marginal  costs  of  x2i  plus  the  component  λt2i.  The 
complementary slackness condition in equation (6) imply that an x2i has to be found that 






) or x2i 
must take a zero value, or both.  
Equation  (7)  restates  the  display  space  restriction  of  the  retailer.  The  complementary 
slackness condition then stipulates that the retailer has to optimize the use of his display space 




). Otherwise, the 
Lagrangian multiplier as an indicator of the shadow price of display space must be set equal 
to zero ( 0 = λ ). 
The differentiation of revenue with respect to x1i and the following transformation of 
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Equation (8) represents the producer surplus per unit of the small package size that means the 
difference between price and marginal cost in ratio to the small package size. To obtain the 
unit price ratio of the larger package size to the smaller package size, requires substitution of 
equation (8) into equation (6): 
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If the unit price ratio of the larger to the smaller package size is greater than 1, a quantity 
surcharge exists. In contrast, a quantity discounts occurs if the unit price ratio is smaller than 
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A reduced form of equation (11) indicates that the unit price ratio of the larger and the smaller 
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Equation (13) implies that if the marginal cost per unit of the large package size exceeds the 
marginal cost per unit of the smaller package size, a quantity surcharge occurs. In contrast, a 
quantity discount exists if the marginal cost per unit of the larger package size is less than the 
marginal cost per unit of the smaller package size (equation 14). 
The marginal cost per unit of a product can be affected by several factors. For example, 
products differ in their storage requirements. Some products need a refrigerated or frozen 
storage, whereas the time requirement per unit to cool a given sized product decreases with   8 
increasing  surface  area.  Since  larger  package  sizes  possess  smaller  surface  areas  in 
comparison  to  an  equivalent  quantity  packaged  in  a  smaller  container,  the  cost  per  unit 
associated with cooling refrigerated and frozen products increases with package size (Ditchev, 
Richardson (1999)). Thus, larger package sizes of refrigerated and frozen products are subject 
to  a  higher  probability  of  quantity  surcharges  than  smaller  sized  packages  due  to  cost 
differentials. 
Due to economies of scale, material costs per unit decrease with larger package sizes for 
food products. Less packaging material per unit of a product is used for larger sized packages 
than for smaller sizes. However, these packaging efficiencies may vary by packaging form 
and material. For example, the stability of boxes or bags may need to be increased for larger 
package  sizes,  resulting  in  a  quantity  surcharge.  Therefore,  the  probability  of  quantity 
surcharges is expected to vary by packaging material. 
Annually, food manufacturers and retailers bargain about prices and purchase conditions 
of products. Depending on market power and bargaining skills, different retailers can achieve 
varying  purchase  prices.  Further,  the  turnover  rates  of  small  and  large  package  sizes  of 
retailers could vary due to different population structures depending on regional differences. 
Large households often live in rural areas whereby a higher demand of large package sizes 
may occur. Retailers located in rural areas order larger amounts of large package sizes and 
thus,  they  may  get  better  purchase  conditions  than  other  retailers.  Thus,  the  incidence  of 
quantity surcharges varies by retailers. 





)  influences  the  incidence  of  quantity 
surcharges. The left-hand side term decreases with rising package size difference. Thus, the 
probability of quantity surcharges decreases with increasing percentage difference between 
small and large package size of a product. A negative effect is expected. Accordingly, the unit 
prices of non-integer ratios of package size pairs are more difficult to compare for consumers   9 
than  integer  ratios.  Therefore,  non-integer  ratios  of  package  size  pairs  are  more  likely  to 
quantity surcharges than integer package size ratios of a product.  
The probability of quantity surcharges increases with an increasing number of package 
sizes available. A positive influence of quantity surcharges is expected for products with an 
increasing number of package sizes available. 
The extent of quantity surcharges and quantity discounts are derived by the unit price 
difference between larger and smaller package sizes. This can be specified by rearrangement 
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Equation (16) suggests that the extent of unit price difference between the two package sizes 
is affected by the difference between the marginal cost per unit of large and small package 
sizes. This relationship indicates that the factors influencing marginal costs per unit discussed 
above also affect the extent of quantity surcharges and quantity discounts.    
 
4. Empirical Estimation 
A number of important steps need to be laid out to link the analytical and empirical models. 
With three possible states, price setting decisions can be modelled using a probit specification 
yielding the estimated probability that the firm i imposes quantity surcharge, linear pricing or 
quantity discount. The bivariate probit is a natural extension in this case. The close 
relationship between the empirical probability and the theoretical model can be envisioned   10 
with a set of structural equations comparing marginal costs of smaller of larger and smaller 
sized packages to determine how firms set the unit prices of different package sizes. As 
argued in the theoretical section, a quantity surcharge is observed, if the marginal cost of the 
larger sized package is greater than the marginal cost of the smaller sized counterpart of a 
product. Conversely, a quantity discount will be observed for the product if the marginal cost 
of the larger sized package is less than the marginal cost of the smaller sized package. Using 
*
si Y  to denote the occurrence of quantity price surcharge and C1i and C2i to denote marginal 
costs of larger and smaller packaged sizes, respectively, we can write for firms that impose 
quantity price surcharges  
0 0 2 1
* > − ⇔ > i i si C C Y                   (17) 
Similarly, using 
*
di Y  as the occurrence of quantity price discount, we can write for firms that 
practice quantity price discounts 
0 0 2 1
* < − ⇔ > i i di C C Y                   (18) 
However, the latent variables are not observable, since they are subjective. What is observed 
are the price setting behaviours  1 = si Y  if  0 2 1 > − i i C C and  0 = si Y  otherwise, for quantity price 
surcharge and behaviours  1 = di Y  if  0 2 1 < − i i C C and  0 = di Y  otherwise, for quantity price 
discount. The unit price setting decision on quantity price surcharges and discounts is then 
modelled as: 
si si si X Y ξ β + =                     (19) 
di di di X Y ξ γ + =                     (20) 
We assume that  1 ) var( ) var( ; 0 ) ( ) ( = = = = di si di si E E ξ ξ ξ ξ ; and  ) cov( si ξ =  ρ ξ = ) cov( di . The t-
statistic on parameter ρ ˆ  is a Wald test of the hypothesis that the cross-equation error term 
correlation is statistically significant. This provides information as to whether full information   11 
likelihood bivariate probit estimates should be used in the estimation, or if single equation 
estimates are adequate.  
As pointed out by Walden (1988), both the degree of quantity price discount and the 
degree of quantity price surcharge can be as interesting as the probability of both quantity 
price discount and quantity price surcharge. An additional issue is therefore the impact of the 
exogenous variables identified above on the degrees of quantity price discount and quantity 










di e X Y + =δ                     (22) 
where 
e
si Y  and 
e
di Y  are the degrees of quantity price surcharge and quantity price discount, 
respectively; 
e
si X  and 
e
di X  are vectors of variables influencing the degrees of quantity price 
discount and quantity price surcharge, respectively; α and δ are vectors of parameters to be 
estimated; and esi and edi denote error terms with zero means and finite variances. 
Applying OLS to the extent of quantity price surcharge and quantity price discount equations 
in (19) and (20) to estimate the α  and δ coefficients will result in sample selection bias, since 
they do not take into account the process generating the observed quantity price surcharge and 
quantity price discount decisions of firms.  
The estimation strategy employed in the present study is a straightforward extension of 
the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. The first step, in this application, involves the 
estimation of equations (14) and (16) using a bivariate probit model. This provides estimates 
of the joint probabilities of the decision to impose quantity price surcharge and the decision to 
offer quantity price discounts for each firm and estimates of β, γ and ρ. These estimates are 
then used to calculate the selection terms for quantity surcharges and quantity discounts. The 
selection terms are added to the degree of quantity surcharge and quantity price discount to 




















di e X Y + + + = λ θ λ θ δ                (24) 
where 
s
i λ   and 
d
i λ are  quantity  price  surcharge  and  quantity  price  discount  variables, 
respectively and 
*
1i e  and 
*
2i e  are the error terms satisfying the usual assumptions. The selection 
variables are given as  
[ ]
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The quantity  2 Φ  denotes the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function whose 
probability density function is denoted by  2 φ  (Limdep, 8.0, User’s Manual, pp. 660-661). It is 
obvious from equations (23 and (24) that if the selection terms are not considered in the 
estimation, the estimates would suffer from omitted variable bias. 
 
5. Data and Variable Definition 
The data used for the analysis are obtained from a unique home scanned consumer panel 
surveyed by the German Society of Consumption Research (GfK, Nuremberg). In this panel, 
over 14,000 households record their daily purchasing activities with a home scanner. For the 
purposes of the present analysis, purchase information for 20 product groups of the categories 
diary products, soft drinks and convenience products during 2003 in the distributive channels 
of the German Top 30 food retailers is extracted from this panel. Furthermore, no promotional 
purchases are considered to exclude the case where a quantity surcharge is based on a higher 
unit  price  of  the  larger  package  size  due  to  a  temporary  promotion  on  the  smaller  sized 
package of the product (Widrick (1979a,b); Zotos, Lysonski (1993)).   13 
After  this  first  extraction,  the  panel  still  includes  almost  2.5  million  single  purchase 
observations  that  extend  to  4,678  different  products.  An  essential  condition  for  the 
determination of quantity discounts and surcharges constitutes the offer of multiple package 
sizes of a product. Following, a selection process identifies those products that are offered in 
multiple package sizes and by visual audit in stores, equivalent packaging is ensured. Thus, in 
the following analysis 635 products have been considered. Depending on the availability of 
package sizes of product i in any stores, unit price comparisons have been independently 
made for each product in any store. Finally, 4421 unit price-size comparisons could be made.  
Comparisons of unit prices for different package size pairs then identify the incidence of 
quantity surcharges. This is determined when the ratio of the unit price of a larger size (UPL) 
to the unit price of the smaller size (UPS) is greater than 1. If it is less than 1, then there is a 
discount. For products available in more than two different package sizes, several unit price 
comparisons could be made. In the case of multiple higher unit prices of large package sizes 
in comparison to a smaller package size for a single product, this product is once marked as 
surcharged. Equally, when a product available in more than two package sizes only contains 
about one surcharged unit price comparison, it is once marked as surcharged.  Definitions, 
means and standard deviations of all the variables employed in the analysis are contained in 
Table 1. 
In the bivariate probit model, the dependent variables are dichotomous and coded as “1” 
to represent quantity surcharges and “0” otherwise and inverse to represent quantity discounts, 
respectively. As independent variables, several product and supply side characteristics are 
included. The average number of package sizes available of a product in any store is 2.2 and a 
positive effect on the likelihood of quantity surcharges is expected. The ratio of large to small 
package size is coded as “1” if the ratio is non-integer (i.e. 400g and 890 g; package size 
ratio=2.225) and also a positive influence is expected due to harder unit price comparison 
possibilities  for  the  consumer.  The  variable  PDIFF_PSi  is  computed  as  the  average   14 
percentage difference between the quantity volume of the large package size and the small 
package size. As indicated in equation (13), a negative influence on the likelihood of quantity 
surcharges  is  expected.  Further,  the  dummy  variable  STORAGE  represents  the  storage 
requirements of the investigated products. This variable is coded as “1” for refrigerated and 
frozen products and as “0” for shelf stored products. A higher probability of higher unit prices 
of larger package sizes is expected for refrigerated and frozen products due to higher marginal 
costs per unit of cooling larger package sizes. 
The price image of a product is represented by the average price. A negative effect is 
expected due to higher information search of consumers with increasing prices. Concerning 
the  varying  incidence  of  quantity  surcharges  by  retailers,  dummy  variables  for  different 
retailers are included in the analysis. Similarly, dichotomous variables are included for the 
different packaging forms. The next section will present the results obtained for the German 
food sector. 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Qualitative Analysis 
The results from the qualitative analysis are presented in Table 2. The results of the 
package size and unit price variations across the 4421 unit price-size comparisons reveal that 
about 9.6% of the brands are sold at a quantity surcharge and 84.7% at a quantity discount. 
Thus, in contrasts to Schmidt (2003) who find no incidence of quantity surcharges in the 
Danish food sector, our findings show that quantity price surcharges is used as a pricing 
strategy  in  the  German  food  sector.  The  average  unit  price  surcharge  is  20.3%,  with  a 
standard deviation of 15.7 and the average discount is 27.9%, with a standard deviation of 
14.3. The standard deviations clearly indicate that package size and unit price variations in the 
German food sector are quite substantial. About 5.7% of the brands have uniform unit prices.    15 
Table 3 presents an overview of the incidence of quantity discounts and surcharges for 
different product groups. The highest incidence of quantity surcharges is found in milk cream 
product  group,  with  an  average  surcharge  of  21.5%.  However,  the  highest  average  unit 
surcharge  of  45.0%  is  observed  for  fruit  nectars.  The  product  groups  of  vegetable  juice, 
cereals and yogurt also show high rates of quantity surcharges with in incidence of over 10%, 
respectively. No incidence of quantity surcharges is found for acerbic drinks, isotonic drinks 
and soups/mulligan. Milk indicates also a very low incidence of quantity surcharges (0.9%). 
6.2 Econometric results 
Table 4 presents the results of the maximum likelihood bivariate probit estimates of the 
equations  explaining  the  probability  of  the  incidence  of  quantity  surcharges  and  quantity 
discounts. The estimates of ρ (correlation between the errors) that maximized the bivariate 
probit likelihood function is -0.99 and is significantly greater than zero at the 1% level. This 
suggests that the random disturbances of the price setting decision of quantity surcharges and 
quantity  discounts  are  affected  in  the  same  direction  by  random  shocks  and  that  their 
occurrence  is  not  statistically  independent.  Thus,  inefficient  parameter  estimates  may  be 
obtained if the equations are estimated separately. The log-likelihood ratio test statistic is 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the independent variables taken together influence 
the price setting decision. 
The coefficient of the variable for number of package size is positive and significantly 
different from zero, suggesting that the larger the number of package sizes for a product, the 
higher  the  probability  of  quantity  surcharge.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  results 
reported by Agrarwal et al. (1993). Secondly, the coefficient for average size of the package is 
negative and significantly different from zero, indicating that the greater the percentage of 
package size difference between multiple sizes of a product, the smaller is the probability of a   16 
higher unit price of the larger package size. This is probably due to the fact that material costs 
per unit generally decline with larger package sizes. 
The  results  also  reveal  that  compared  to  shelf  stored  products,  refrigerated  or  frozen 
products have a higher probability of attracting a quantity surcharge, a finding that supports 
the assertion of Walden (1988) for those products where carrying costs are higher for retailers, 
retailers  should  have  less  incentive  to  provide  discounts.  Further,  the  results  show  that 
products offered in non-integer multiple package sizes have a higher probability of attracting 
quantity surcharges. Price comparisons of products are more difficult for consumers when 
package size ratio is non-integer. The packaging form also appears to influence the likelihood 
of a higher unit price for larger package size. Products packaged in a bag-board combination, 
in plastic cups or in coated films have a significantly higher probability of attracting quantity 
surcharges than the reference package form. 
Several of the individual dummy variables included to capture the fixed retailer effects 
were  significantly  different  from  zero.  Moreover,  tests  of  the  null  hypotheses  that  these 
variables are jointly equal to zero are rejected for both quantity price surcharge and price 
discount equations. Thus, for both quantity surcharge and discount, product characteristics 
alone do not explain unit price differences for smaller and larger package sizes. The price 
image  of  the  product,  captured  by  the  average  price  appears  to  negatively  influence  the 
probability of a quantity price surcharge, indicating that products that are positioned with 
lower average prices are less likely to attract quantity surcharges, while those products with 
generally higher average prices are more likely to attract quantity price discounts. 
Table  5  presents  results  of  the  unit  price  difference  equations.  Since  the  two-step 
procedure employed in the analysis results in heteroskedastic residuals, White’s formula is 
used to calculate the standard errors. The inverse Mills ratios (λ) are significant for both 
quantity price surcharge and quantity price discount equations, indicating that selectivity bias   17 
would  have  resulted  if  the  price  setting  equation  had  been  estimated  without  taking  into 
account the decision to impose quantity price surcharge and quantity price discount. 
The  negative  and  significant  coefficient  of  the  number  of  package  sizes  available 
indicates that the degree of quantity surcharge on a surcharged product decreases with rising 
number of package sizes. Similarly, the negative and significant coefficient of the number of 
package sizes in the quantity discount equation indicates that the degree of quantity discount 
decreases  with rising number of package sizes  The significant negative coefficient of the 
storage characteristics also suggests that refrigerated and frozen products generally  attract 
lower quantity surcharges, provide that there is a surcharge. While the estimated coefficient 
for  storage  characteristics  is  negative  significant  for  quantity  discounts,  it  is  positive  and 
significant for quantity surcharge. This finding suggests that refrigerated and frozen products 
generally  attract  lower  quantity  surcharges  for  surcharged  products,  but  higher  quantity 
discounts for discounted products. The significant negative effect of products offered in non-
integer multiple package sizes on quantity discount shows the higher the difference between 
the unit prices of a non-integer sized package pair the lower the degree of quantity discount. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  significant  positive  effect  of  the  same  variable  on  quantity  price 
discount indicates that the higher difference between the unit prices of a non-integer sized 
package pair, the higher the quantity discount for discounted products. 
The coefficient of the variable  representing percentage difference of package sizes is 
positive  and  significantly  different  from  zero,  suggesting  that  the  larger  the  difference 
between the packaged quantity of small and large package size, the larger is the magnitude 
between  the  unit  prices  of  small  and  large  package  size.  The  negative  and  significant 
coefficient  on  bag-board  for  quantity  surcharge  regression  and  positive  and  significant 
coefficient  for  quantity  discount  estimation  indicate  that  the  degree  of  quantity  price 
surcharge is lower for products in bag-boards, while the degree of quantity price discount is 
higher for products packaged this way.   18 
The  estimated  coefficients  for  individual  dummy  variables  representing  retailer  fixed 
effects are individually significantly different from zero, with the exception of Karstadt for 
quantity surcharges and metro, karstadt and tengel for quantity discounts. Moreover, joint 
tests of the null hypothesis that all retailer effects are equal using a likelihood ratio test, was 
rejected for both quantity surcharge and discount equations, indicating that these effects are 
important in explaining the degrees of quantity price surcharge and quantity price discount.  
As  argued  by  Agrawal  et  al.  (1993),  grocery  expenditures  account  for  a  substantial 
proportion of disposable income of households. Hence, quantity price surcharges over long 
periods  of  time  could  mean  significant  losses  for  consumers  purchasing  such  items.  We 
employ an approach proposed by Cude and Walker (1984) to analyze the expected value of 
return  from  purchasing  a  larger  size  of  products.  The  approach  involves  multiplying  the 
percentage  incidence  of  quantity  surcharges  and  discounts  with  the  mean  surcharge  or 
discount for each product, respectively. The expected value of return from purchasing larger 
package size of products from our analysis is 0.05 Euro, suggesting that quantity discounts 
also dominate the frequency and magnitude of quantity surcharges in the German food sector. 
Accordingly, the expected value of return from purchasing always the largest package size of 
any product as a shopping strategy reveals that consumers can save about 253.08 Euros. The 
sum of the unit prices of all largest package sizes are 253.08 Euro less expensive than the sum 
of the unit prices of the smallest package sizes of the according products.  
Conclusion 
This  study  examined  the  incidence  and  determinants  of  quantity  price  discounts  and 
quantity  price  surcharges  using  a  consumer  panel  data  for  the  German  food  sector.  The 
empirical results from the study provide several new insights into the pricing behavior of 
stores in the German food sector. Quite interesting is the finding that almost 10% of the 
investigated products showed higher unit prices for larger package sizes, although the extent   19 
of  price  surcharges  varied  among  product  categories.  However,  quantity  price  discounts 
(lower unit prices for larger packages) appear to dominate supermarket products, with the 
degree of quantity discounts varying among different product groups. 
The  findings  from  the  econometric  analyses  indicate  that  several  factors  significantly 
influence the probability of and the degrees of quantity price surcharges and quantity price 
discounts.  In  particular,  product  characteristics  and  retailer  fixed  effects  were  found  to 
significantly influence quantity surcharging and discounting decisions of retailers. The results 
indicate that refrigerated and frozen products are more likely to attract higher unit prices for 
larger package sizes than items stored on shelves. These findings are probably due to the 
increased storage costs per unit for larger packages that must be refrigerated or frozen. Both 
the probability and the degree of quantity price surcharges and quantity price discounts were 
found  to  vary  with  package  form  and  material.  Products  packaged  in  a  bag-board 
combination,  in  plastic  cups  or  in  coated  films  have  a  significantly  higher  probability  of 
attracting quantity surcharges. 
The finding of quantity price surcharges in the German food sector, despite the practice 
of unit pricing suggests that consumers either do not adequately price search, or that 
households with large families and high demands still purchase large packages to avoid 
frequent trips to the supermarkets. Thus, while unit price information could help increase 
awareness and ease of information processing, it is not able to prevent quantity surcharges.
2 
The empirical results also suggest that quantity surcharges are often a consequence of cost 
differentials between large and small package sizes that the retailer passes down to the 
consumer. Thus, quantity surcharges do not occur as a technique of consumer extraction but 
rather as a consequence of cost differentials.   20 
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QS  1 if product includes a quantity surcharge, 0 
otherwise 
0.09  0.30 
QD  1 if product includes a quantity discount, 0 
otherwise 
0.85  0.36 
PDIFF_PRi  Average unit price difference between larger and 
smaller package size of product i [%] 
 
-0.22  0.21 
 
Independent Variables 
N_PSAVAI  Number of package sizes available  2.16  0.45 
PS_RATIO  1 if package size ratio is non-integer, 0 otherwise  0.48  0.50 
PDIFF_PSi  Average package size difference between larger 
and smaller package size of product i [%] 
1.29  1.21 
STORAGE  1 if product has to be stored in a refrigerator or 
freezer, 0 otherwise 
0.44  0.50 
PRICE  Average price of a product  1.00  0.72 
METRO  1 if distribution channel belongs to Metro Group, 
0 otherwise 
0.09  0.29 
KARSTADT  1 if distribution channel belongs to Karstadt, 0 
otherwise 
0.09  0.09 
TENGEL  1 if distribution channel belongs to Tengelmann, 0 
otherwise 
0.05  0.22 
GLOBUS  1 if distribution channel belongs to Globus St. 
Wendel, 0 otherwise 
0.03  0.18 
WALMART  1 if distribution channel belongs to Wal-Mart, 0 
otherwise 
0.03  0.18 
COOPSH  1 if distribution channel belongs to Coop 
Schleswig-Holstein, 0 otherwise 
0.03  0.16 
OTHER_S  Reference store  0.03  0.11 
BOARDBAG  1 if product is packaged in a bag and a board, 0 
otherwise 
0.13  0.33 
PET_CUP  1 if product is packaged in a plastic cup, 0 
otherwise 
0.30  0.46 
C_FILM  1 if product is packaged in a coated film, 0 
otherwise 
0.03  0.18 
OTHER_PT  Reference package types 
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Table 2: Incidence of quantity discounts and quantity surcharges on the German food sector, 
2003 









































Linear pricing  251  5.7  0.00  0.00  0.0  0,0 
Quantity surcharge 
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Cola / cola containing drinks  383  3.1  17.7  83.8  -24.1 
Fruit nectar  128  1.6  45.0  86.9  -37.6 
Fruit juice  222  6.3  20.6  90.5  -34.5 
Mixed fruit juice  330  3.3  18.9  94.2  -39.1 
Vegetable juice  37  16.2  16.1  70.3  -21.5 
Table / mineral water  227  3.9  24.7  82.4  -32.1 
Soda drinks  244  5.3  29.1  77.9  -24.3 
Isotonic drinks  4  0  0.0  100.0  -27.3 
Tea drinks  69  1.4  25.0  94.2  -47.3 
Near water drinks  101  2.9  32.5  91.1  -27.6 
Butter / butter containing 
products 
149  7.4  22.8  91.9  -28.6 
yogurt  457  10.9  24.3  83.4  -25.1 
Milk  309  0.9  17.9  98.1  -32.1 
Milk drinks  199  6.5  10.2  89.9  -22.9 
Milk cream products  346  58.9  21.5  31.8  -13.5 
Curd cheese  558  2.3  11.9  95.9  -26.9 
Cereals  505  12.1  14.2  85.1  -18.8 
Soups/mulligan  81  0  0.0  100.0  -49.1 
Pizza frozen 
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Table 4: Bivariate probit estimates of the price setting equation of quantity surcharges and 
quantity discounts 















         
INTERCEPT  -2.083**  -11.435  1.178**  8.505 
N_PSAVAI  0.316**  4.647  -0.133**  -2.322 
STORAGE  0.281**  2.157  0.026  0.202 
PS_RATIO  0.609**  8.762  -0.729**  -12.245 
PDIFF_PSi  -0.360**  -8.442  0.338**  8.415 
PRICE  -0.409**  -5.066  0.443**  6.079 
METRO  0.192**  1.969  -0.238**  -2.841 
KARSTADT  0.344  1.225  -0.468*  -1.935 
TENGEL  0.382**  3.241  -0.337**  -3.078 
GLOBUS  0.241  1.536  -0.197  -1.395 
WALMART  0.189  1.247  -0.353**  -2.691 
COOPSH  0.342**  2.102  -0.277*  -1.873 
BOARDBAG  0.866**  6.431  -0.595**  -5.026 
PET_CUP  0.366**  2.681  -0.253*  -1.892 
C_FILM  0.407**  2.299  -0.229  -1.401 
         
Rho (1,2)  -0.996** 
(-135.055) 
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Table 5: Two-step Heckman estimation of the extend of quantity surcharges and quantity 
discounts 

























N_PSAVAI  -0.058**  -2.027  0.057**  10.185 
STORAGE  -0.085*  -1.942  0.030**  4.124 
PS_RATIO  -0.152**  -3.845  0.028**  3.490 
PDIFF_PSi  0.052**  2.127  -0.043**  -16.377 
METRO  -0.093**  -3.662  -0.008  -1.044 
KARSTADT  -0.053  -0.831  -0.016  -0.720 
TENGEL  -0.128**  -3.936  0.005  0.467 
COOPSH  -0.084*  -1.789  0.024*  1.745 
BOARDBAG  -0.154**  -4.208  0.089**  13.212 
PET_CUP  -0.059  -1.073  0.031**  3.764 






















171.016  1037.185 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 This directive became effective in Germany in September 2000. Afterwards, all retailers in the country are 
obliged to indicate the unit price next to the selling price of a product. 
2 A recent study on unit pricing in Great Britain by Lennard et al. (2003) revealed that 51% of the respondents 
frequently use unit pricing as information source to find the best buy option. Further, 28% stated that unit pricing 
is too complicated to use, 37% agreed that their time is too valuable to select the best buy for everything and 
32% mentioned that they do not have the time to use unit pricing. These findings indicate that unit pricing alone 
is not enough to protect consumers against price quantity price surcharges. 